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50 YEARS WAS TOO LONG TO WAIT: THE SYRIAN REFUGEE
CRISIS HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR A SECOND
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING
TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
Major Yvonne S. Brakel,* Rachel E. Kester, and Samantha L. Potter**
I. INTRODUCTION – THE WORLD AND ITS LAW WERE NOT READY FOR THE
SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS
President Trump stated “we don’t want them here”1 as he signed an executive order barring travelers from seven predominantly Muslim countries
for at least 90 days and refugees from anywhere in the world for at least 120
days.2 He assured the American public that this order was not a Muslim ban,
but instead, was a move intended to “keep radical Islamic terrorists out of
the United States of America.”3 With that official act, he kept his campaign
promise and halted former-President Obama’s commitment to welcome
110,000 refugees into the United States in fiscal year 2017.4 The effects of
his order were instant and highly criticized by voices across the globe. Within hours, the headlines were flooded with stories of refugees being denied
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1. Jeremy Diamond & Steve Almasy, Trump’s Immigration Ban Sends Shockwaves,
CNN (Jan. 30 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/donald-trump-executive-orderimmigration-reaction/.
2. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). This order has since been
replaced with the President’s most recent executive order, 13780.
3. Diamond & Almasy, supra note 1.
4. Juliet Eilperin, White House Raises Refugee Target to 110,000, WASH. POST (Sept.
14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/09/14/white-houseplans-to-accept-at-least-110000-refugees-in-2017/?utm_term=.58adfbf37619.
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boarding onto the flights that should have delivered them to their new lives
in the United States.5
Among the hundreds of Syrian refugees who found themselves stranded following issuance of President Trump’s executive order, were Rafiq alSaleh and his family.6 After Syrian airstrikes began targeting civilians in
Aleppo, Rafiq and his then-pregnant wife Ghada Dibo made the difficult
and dangerous decision to flee their home in Syria.7 They escaped with their
two young children to Jordan, moving through the desert at night to avoid
detection.8 After two years of waiting in Jordan, Rafiq, Ghada, and their
three children were accepted for resettlement in the United States.9 Having
plane tickets in hand and a new home waiting for them in upstate New York,
they sold all their possessions and prepared to embark on a journey to a
place where Rafiq said there is “democracy and freedom.”10 At the time his
story was published on NPR, he had never met an American, but his friends
who resettled in the United States assured him that there “you feel like you
are a human being — a citizen. You have rights. No one can oppress you.
Even the children have rights.”11 With one stroke of a pen, President Trump
may have changed Rafiq al-Saleh’s feelings about the United States forever.
Hours before they were scheduled to embark upon their journey to ‘democracy and freedom,’ he and his family were told they could not board their
flight to New York.12 Devastated, Rafiq began hoping for salvation in another country. He heard that Canada had offered to take in the Syrian refugees who had been approved for resettlement in the United States. “Maybe
they will let us go to another country — to Europe or Canada.”13
It is natural to get lost in the emotion of the refugee stories, but one
must also remember the catalyst behind President Trump’s immigration
order. The violent attacks in Paris and Brussels were carried out by members
of the Islamic State who managed to infiltrate the migration of Syrian refugees.14 Recall also the boasting of an Islamic State commander, “[w]e have

5. Jane Arraf, Trump’s Immigration Ban Has Left Syrian Family Stuck in Jordan, NPR
(Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/02/02/512998371/trumps-immi
gration-ban-leaves-syrian-family-stuck-in-jordan.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Arraf, supra note 5.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Anthony Faiola & Souad Mekhennet, Tracing the Path of Four Terrorists Sent to
Europe by the Islamic State, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/world/national-security/how-europes-migrant-crisis-became-an-opportunity-for-
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sent many operatives to Europe with the refugees . . . Some of our brothers
have fulfilled their mission, but others are still waiting to be activated.”15
After watching the news coverage of bloody terrorist attacks throughout
Europe, the Middle East and the United States, fear of an uncontrolled mass
migration of refugees is understandable. But, President Trump’s order did
not just stop an uncontrolled migration of Syrians into the United States. It
stopped the controlled resettlement of refugees who had completed an extensive screening process lasting anywhere between 18 and 24 months before even being approved to enter the United States.16 Prior to President
Trump’s election, the Obama administration was also heavily criticized for
accepting a limited number of Syrian refugees for resettlement.17 And, the
United States was not alone. Many of the rich Gulf States and close neighbors to Syria, including Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain, do not accept Syrian refugees.18 Nor do Russia, Japan, Singapore, or
South Korea.19 Eastern Europe, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Estonia have taken
steps to reduce the influx of Syrian refugees. Hungary, perhaps the most
extreme case, has built a border fence to keep refugees seeking asylum out.20
The fundamental right to seek asylum21 is recognized in multiple human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human

isis/2016/04/21/ec8a7231-062d-4185-bb27-cc7295d35415_story.html?utm_term=.f14f23
430ccd.
15. Marc Thiessen, ISIS Is Smuggling Terrorists Among Syrian Refugees, NEWSWEEK
(Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/how-isis-smuggles-terrorists-among-syrianrefugees-453039.
16. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, US Resettlement Facts, UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/588a14fc4 (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
17. Jordan Fabian, NY Attack Hangs over Obama Push for Action on Refugees, HILL
(Sept. 20, 2016), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/296739-ny-attack-hangs-overobama-push-for-action-on-refugees.
18. Facts & Figures: Syria Refugee Crisis & International Resettlement, AMNESTY INT’L
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/12/facts-figures-syria-refugeecrisis-international-resettlement/.
19. Id.
20. Rick Noack, This Map Helps Explain Why Some European Countries Reject Refugees, and Others Love Them, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/08/this-map-helps-explain-why-some-european-countriesreject-refugees-and-others-love-them/?utm_term=.e66b9341ce01.
21. “An asylum seeker is an individual who is seeking international protection. In countries with individualised procedures, an asylum seeker is someone whose claim has not yet
been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum
seeker will ultimately be recognised as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum
seeker.” What’s the Difference Between a Refugee and an Asylum Seeker?, AMNESTY INT’L
AUSTL. (Nov. 6, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org.au/whats-the-difference-between-a-refugeeand-an-asylum-seeker/.
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Rights22 and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.23 The
1951 Convention, which was created in response to the mass influx of European refugees following WWI and WWII, attempted to create a “comprehensive codification of the rights of refugees at the international level.”24
Though it remains the cornerstone of the international refugee regime, the
1951 Convention has several shortcomings. The Convention does not require states to grant asylum, nor does it specify how states are to share the
burden of refugee resettlement.25 As a result, the world is left with a patchwork of domestic refugee laws and policies, which increase regional instability and security concerns posed by the current refugee crises.
With no true burden-sharing requirements on the international community, states of first asylum26 are left alone to bear the cost of protracted refugee situations. Further complicating the problem, the refugees are oftentimes
exposed to abject poverty and deplorable living conditions, placing them at
risk of exploitation, radicalization, violence, injury, and illness. The United
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are
currently 65.3 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide,27 21.3 of whom
are refugees, meaning they have left their country seeking refuge in another
state.28 Despite numbers that surpass those following WWII, only a small
number of states are carrying the current weight of world’s refugees.
A Second Optional Protocol to the 1951 Convention is needed to create
a predictable and equitable refugee resettlement plan among the international community. Section II discusses the current international treaties relevant
to refugees, including a discussion of individual rights and state duties under
the 1951 Convention on Status of Refugees and the 1967 Optional Protocol.29 After highlighting the limited duties imposed upon states, the authors
will illustrate the inconsistent state practices of a handful of states in Part
III.30 In Part IV, the authors will then explain that the patchwork of immigra22. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]. Article 14 specifically provides refugees the right “to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”
23. U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
189 U.N.T.S 150 (July 7, 1951) [hereinafter Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees].
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. First states of asylum are those countries that are geographically close to the conflict
and will, solely based on their proximity, face the initial brunt of any mass refugee movements. In the case of the Syrian refugee crisis, the first countries of asylum are Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon.
27. Forcibly displaced persons include 21.13 refugees, 40.8 internally displaced persons,
and 3.2 asylum seekers. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS:
FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015 2 (2016), http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.
28. Id.
29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part III.
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tion policies poses a significant threat to both regional and international security.31 In light of those threats, a Second Optional Protocol to the 1951
Convention is needed to promote efficient and fair resettlement of refugees.
Part V of this paper will explain how the Optional Protocol could distribute
the refugee burden across many states, as well as addressing the obvious
obstacles to concluding a binding international agreement.32 Finally, Part VI
provides a conclusion.33
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW
“CONSIDERING that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the
General Assembly have affirmed the principle that human beings shall
enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination . . .”34

The current legal framework of the international refugee regime
acknowledges the fundamental right to seek asylum. The key documents
establishing and reiterating this right include the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, and its Optional Protocol.35 Together these agreements establish some basic protections that must be afforded to refugees and asylum-seekers; however, the
existing regime affords states significant discretion in their interpretation of
obligations.
A.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Following the devastation of the Second World War, the international
community vowed to prevent similar atrocities from occurring in the future.
In addition to the newly drafted UN Charter, world leaders wanted a separate document highlighting fundamental human rights common to individuals around the globe.36 Representatives from 18 nations with culturally di31. See infra Part IV.
32. See infra Part V.
33. See infra Part VI.
34. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23.
35. Many other instruments discuss the right to asylum. For example, the Convention on
Rights of the Child (CRC) reinforces children’s rights to asylum. The CRC was developed to
recognize the serious injustices children faced, as well as their particularly special needs.
Stemming from the UDHR and the 1951 Convention, Article 22(1) requires that state parties
take appropriate measures to ensure that children who are considered refugees or are seeking
refugee status shall receive protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of applicable rights, whether accompanied by their parents or not. However, similar to the other
Conventions, protections are still limited in the name of state sovereignty.
36. History of the Document, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/universaldeclaration/history-document/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2017).
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verse backgrounds drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), which was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly on
10 December 1948.37 The UDHR marks a milestone in the evolution of human rights and represents the global interest of protecting basic standards
for the dignity and rights of individuals.
Among the many rights acknowledged in the Declaration, Article 14
provides that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution.”38 Alternative language guaranteeing the right to
be granted asylum was rejected by many participating states as an infringement upon sovereignty.39 The result of that change continues to plague international refugee laws and customs to this day. The UDHR provides a
basic right to individuals, yet states are given significant discretion when
interpreting and defining their responsibility toward refugees and asylum
seekers. As Christian Joppke explains, “states are not just free to grant, but
also to prescribe, the conditions under which asylum is to be enjoyed.”40
Unfortunately, subsequent agreements have not corrected this inconsistency.
B.

The 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Optional
Protocol

While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights acknowledged the
basic right to asylum, the mass increase in refugees post-WWII showed that
more legal guidance was needed. In 1946, the United Nations created the
International Refugee Organization (IRO),41 a “resettlement agency” for
displaced persons.42 The IRO was given control over the “legal and political
protection of persons who are its concern.”43 In an attempt to inform future
international refugee efforts, the IRO requested the creation of a comprehensive study of the history of refugee policy from the time of the League of
Nations to the current IRO efforts. This study, A Study of Statelessness, outlined the aspects of statelessness, which included travel, personal status,
education, reciprocity, expulsion, taxation, among other concerns.44 At the
conclusion of the study, the IRO recommended the creation of a new independent agency dedicated to protecting stateless persons when national
37. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 22.
38. Id. at art. 14 (outlining the right to seek asylum).
39. Christian Joppke, Asylum and State Sovereignty: A Comparison of the United States,
Germany and Britain, in CHALLENGE TO THE NATION-STATE: IMMIGRATION IN WESTERN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 109, 110–111. (1998).
40. Id. at 111.
41. G.A Res. 62 (I), (Dec. 15, 1946).
42. Id.
43. Gilbert Jaeger, On the History of the International Protection of Refugees, 83 INT’L
REV. OF THE RED CROSS 727, 732 (2001).
44. Id. at 733.
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agencies cannot.45 After considering the results of the Study of Statelessness,
the Economic and Social Council authorized the creation of an ad hoc committee with the purpose of investigating refugees and stateless persons,46
thus beginning the negotiations to create a universal document outlining the
rights of refugees and the responsibilities of high contracting parties to support these rights.
After nearly a year of negotiations and thirty-five committee meetings,
the Convention on the Status of Refugees came into force on 28 July 1951.47
This Convention was designed to be the “universal international instrument
for the protection of refugees.”48 It was the first document to specify the
rights afforded refugees while emphasizing the duties agreed upon by the
High Contracting Parties.49 As drafted, the Convention restricted refugee
status to persons whose circumstances had come about “as a result of events
occurring before 1 January 1951,” “events occurring in Europe,” or “events
occurring in Europe or elsewhere.”50 As the world refugee situation evolved,
so did the law. In 1967, the Optional Protocol to the 1951 Convention entered into force and removed both the temporal and geographic restrictions.51 Thus, all refugees were granted equal status under the definition
of the Convention, irrespective of time or nationality.52
1.

Rights Afforded to Refugees

The 1951 Convention established the internationally recognized definition of a “refugee,” the principle of non-refoulement, and a multitude of
rights afforded to refugees.53 Article 1A(2) states that a refugee is a person:
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his

45. Id. at 735.
46. Id. at 735.
47. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE REFUGEE CONVENTION,
1951: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES ANALYSED WITH A COMMENTARY BY DR. PAUL WEIS
(1990), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/travaux/4ca34be29/refugee-convention-1951travaux-preparatoires-analysed-commentary-dr-paul.html.
48. Id. at 4.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 4–5.
51. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23.
52. G.A Res. 2198 (XXI), Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Dec. 16, 1966).
53. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23.
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former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.54

The cornerstone protection provided to refugees under the 1951 Convention is the principle of non-refoulement as expressed in Article 33. This
principle protects asylum-seekers or refugees from being returned to a country “where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.”55 Protection against refoulement is afforded to all persons unless
they have been deemed a danger to the security of the country, or having
been convicted of a particularly serious crime, and considered a danger to
the community.56 The Convention also provides a variety of other important
rights to refugees. For example, Article 31 ensures that Contracting States
will not impose penalties on those who enter a country illegally to seek asylum. It further prohibits Contracting States from restricting the movements
of refugees unless those restrictions are necessary to fulfill the refugee application process.57 Article 32 maintains that Contracting States “shall not
expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order.”58 The Convention also protects refugees’ rights to education, employment, and access to justice.
2.

Duties Agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties

While the Convention provided numerous protections, including the
critical obligation of non-refoulement, the drafters left it to the states to decide which refugees they would allow to resettle in their countries.59
“[S]tates remain under no obligation to grant to refugees asylum in the sense
of lasting protection against the exercise of jurisdiction by another state and
an opportunity to integrate themselves indefinitely in the state of refuge.”60
Further complicating the matter, the Preamble highlights the potential for
unequal burdens posed by refugees in specific regions and calls all nations
to co-operate,61 yet what that cooperation should consist of is not addressed,
described, or defined anywhere in the Convention.
Respect for state sovereignty also places limits on the amount of support states are required to provide to the Office of the United Nations High
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
(2007).
60.
61.

Id. at art. 1, A(2).
Id. at art. 33.
Id. at art. 33.2.
Id. at art. 31.1, 31.2.
Id. at art. 32.
James C Hathaway, Why Refugee Law Still Matters, 8 MELB. J. INT’L L. 89, 100
GUY GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 225 (1983).
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23, preamble.
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Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).62 Article 35 of the 1951 Convention
also calls upon states to undertake to cooperate with the UNHCR in the exercise of its functions.63 Recognizing the duty of the Office of the High
Commissioner to make reports to the UN on issues of its concern, the Convention also asks states to undertake to provide with requested statistical
data concerning the condition of refugees, the implementation of the Convention and any laws, regulations, and decrees relating to refugees.64 Unfortunately, protection of state sovereignty has created an inconsistent patchwork of national refugee laws and policies across the globe, which in turn,
has led to an inequitable distribution of the burden posed by the current refugee crisis and poor quality protections provided to the world’s 65.3 million
displaced persons.
The existing international refugee regime firmly establishes the principle of non-refoulement, but it fails to place specific obligations upon states
governing the grant of asylum or sharing the burden of refugee resettlement.
As a result, individual states are left free to pursue their own agendas, which
are often guided by short-term self-interests rather than equitable goals enshrined in the spirit of the current framework.
III. INTERNATIONAL PATCHWORK OF STATE REFUGEE LAWS AND POLICIES
“CONSIDERING that the United Nations has, on various occasions,
manifested its profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure
refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and
freedoms . . .”65

The Syrian refugee crisis has highlighted significant deficiencies in the
international refugee regime. Without a binding obligation to grant asylum
or assist with the equitable resettlement of refugees, states are free to decide
their own asylum laws and policies. As a result, there are dramatically different domestic approaches to accepting asylum-seekers and refugees, most
of which do not necessarily afford the “the widest possible exercise” 66 of the
fundamental right to asylum envisioned by the Convention. First, the refugee policies found in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, the states of first asylum, and how their laws and policies have adapted with the crisis are discussed. Then, the authors will explore immigration policies in a handful of
62. The General Assembly established the UNHCR in 1951. Its two principle functions
include ensuring international protection to refugees under its competence and seeking durable solutions for refugees in cooperation with state governments. See G.A. Res. 428 (V),
Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Dec. 14, 1950).
63. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23, at art. 35.
64. Id.
65. Id. at Preamble.
66. Id.
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countries removed from the Syrian crisis, both geographically and in political response to the crisis. The list of countries discussed is intended to be
representative of the greater international community but is by no means
exhaustive. The states of first asylum for the Syrian refugee crisis have become overrun with refugees and, as result, more than one million of the refugees have opted to seek asylum in Europe. Despite regional agreements,
Europe’s asylum policies also vary dramatically and, similar to those in the
states of first asylum, have changed rapidly in response to the recent flood
of refugees.
A.

The States of First Asylum

The states of first asylum67 for the Syrian refugee crisis are Syria’s bordering neighbors—Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. These three nation states
bear a high burden of the crisis, together taking in over 4 million of the estimated 5.9 million Syrian refugees. While these states have shown great
generosity toward the Syrian refugees, each has sought to restrict the massive influx of refugees with a variety of administrative, legal, and physical
barriers at times throughout the conflict.68
1.

Turkey

As of February 2017, it was estimated that Turkey had accepted 2.9
million Syrian refugees, more than double the number taken by Lebanon,
the second greatest receiver of Syrian refugees.69 Turkey is a party to the
1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees; however, it has not ratified the
1967 Optional Protocol thus limiting its definition of a refugee to European
asylum seekers.70 Turkey implemented its international obligations under the
Convention through the Turkey Settlement Act (TSA) and, more recently,
the Law on Foreigners or International Protection (LFIP). The TSA grants

67. States of first asylum are the first safe countries that refugees reach. See Ariane
Rummery, Greater Support in Countries of First Asylum Needed to Stem Refugee Outflows,
UNHCR (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&skip=
819&docid=55ddd2c86&query=greater support in countries of first.
68. Human Rights Watch, Syria: Events in 2016, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw
.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/syria#634b1d (last visited Mar 29, 2017).
69. Syria Regional Refugee Response Data, UNHCR, http://data.unhcr.org/syrian
refugees/regional.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
70. States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the
1967 Protocol, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/statesparties-1951-convention-its-1967-protocol.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
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persons of Turkish descent and culture eligibility for settlement in the country and possible citizenship.71
In early 2011, the Turkish government tried to convince Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to engage in reforms that could have contained the
militarization of the Syrian uprising. 72 After that attempt failed, Turkey took
a clear stance against the Assad regime and opened its borders to fleeing
Syrians providing humanitarian assistance to civilians and internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside Syria.73 While the Syrian nationals were not
recognized as refugees under Turkish law, Turkey did consider the incoming
Syrians “guests” deserving of temporary protections.74 In 2013, Turkey created the LFIP which allows non-European refugees limited protection under
one of several types of temporary status—”conditional refugee status, humanitarian residence permit, or temporary protection”– allowing them to
remain in the country until a long-term place of settlement outside Turkey is
determined.75 The LFIP also protects the Syrians against refoulement.76
In recent years, however, Turkey has significantly restricted its policy.
Since March 2015, Turkey has maintained a closed-border policy prohibiting entry of all but seriously injured Syrian refugees.77 Implementing this
policy has been two-fold: first, Turkey has focused efforts on the construction of a planned 511 kilometer concrete wall along its border;78 second,
Turkish border guards have pushed back thousands of Syrians, forcing those
fleeing violence and persecution to either continue their perilous journey for
asylum elsewhere or return to their war-torn homeland.79 Those returned to
Syria are often forced to seek shelter in dangerous Syrian border displacement camps or hide in man-made ditches along the Syrian-Turkish border.80
Asylum-seekers who have resisted Turkey’s push-back have faced severe
71. Wendy Zeldin, Refugee Law and Policy: Turkey, LIB. OF CONGRESS (Mar. 2016),
https://www./law/help/refugee-law/turkey.php.
72. See Souad Ahmadoun, Turkey’s Policy Toward Syrian Refugees: Domestic Repercussions and the Need for International Support, 47 SWP COMMENTS 1 (2014).
73. Id.
74. DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS INSTITUTE, THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS: REFUGEES,
CONFLICT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (2016).
75. Zeldin, supra note 71.
76. Id.
77. UN: Press Turkey to Open Border Summit Should Tackle Responsibility for Refugees, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 20, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/20/un-pressturkey-open-border [hereinafter UN: Press Turkey to Open Border].
78. Chase Winter, Turkey Builds More than Half of Syrian Border Wall, DW.COM (Feb.
26, 2017), http://www.dw.com/en/turkey-builds-more-than-half-of-syrian-border-wall/a-3772
3820.
79. UN: Press Turkey to Open Border, supra note 77.
80. Turkey: Open Borders to Syrians Fleeing ISIS: At Least 30,000 Trapped Amid
Northern Syria Fighting, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news
/2016/04/14/turkey-open-borders-syrians-fleeing-isis [hereinafter Turkey: Open Borders].
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punishments. According to a report by the Human Rights Watch, Turkish
border guards have killed at least five Syrians and seriously injured approximately 14 others who tried to cross the border into Turkey.81
The Turkish government defends its decision to close its borders and
promotes the creation of a “safe zone” within Syria to which people can
seek refuge. In July 2015, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey said that “cleansing the region of all threatening elements and establishing a safe zone constitutes the basis of 1.7 million Syrian refugees’ return.”82
The same month, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the foreign minister, said that, “[w]hen
areas in northern Syria are cleared of the [ISIS] threat, the safe zones will be
filled naturally . . . People who have been displaced can be placed in those
safe areas.”83 Unfortunately, attacks on numerous Syrian “safe zones” have
proven his assessment inaccurate.84
In March 2016, Turkey marginally altered its closed-border policy by
signing an agreement with the European Union that forced all new irregular
migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands to be returned to Turkey.85 For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, the
EU agreed to resettle another Syrian living in Turkey to a European nation.86
2.

Jordan

Jordan houses upwards of 1.1 million refugees, including 658,000 Syrians, but is neither a party to the 1951 Convention nor the 1967 Protocol.87
Under its domestic laws, there is no distinction between foreigners and refugees.88 In 1998, Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the
UNHCR, which improved protections for refugees within its territory.89 Pursuant to the MOU, Jordan accepted the 1951 Convention’s definition of
“refugee” 90 and agreed to respect the principle of non-refoulement.91 The
81. UN: Press Turkey to Open Border, supra note 77.
82. Turkey: Open Borders, supra note 80.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. European Commission, EU-Turkey Statement: Questions and Answers, EUROPEA.EU
(Mar. 19, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.htm.
86. Id.
87. Issam Saliba, Refugee Law and Policy: Jordan, LIB. OF CONGRESS (Mar. 2016),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/jordan.php.
88. SARAH BIDINGER ET AL., PROTECTING SYRIAN REFUGEES: LAWS, POLICIES, AND
GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY SHARING 60 (2014), http://www.bu.edu/law/files/2015/07/FINAL
FullReport.pdf.
89. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Jordan and UNHCR
(Apr. 5, 1998), http://mawgeng.a.m.f.unblog.fr/files/2009/02/moujordan.doc, archived at
https://perma.cc/N28J-MV22t.
90. Id. at art. 1.
91. Id. at art. 2.
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UNHCR also gained the ability to provide assistance to the refugees located
in Jordan.92
In response to the Syrian refugee crisis, Jordan initially had an opendoor policy with the Syrian refugees.93 Syrian nationals were exempted from
visa requirements ordinarily required by Jordanian law.94 Unfortunately, as
the number of refugees in Jordan dramatically increased so did the strain on
its already limited resources and water.95 These economic pressures led to
changes in refugee policies, including restrictions on the occupations available to the Syrian refugees.96 It was ultimately security threats that finally
ended Jordan’s open-door policy. In June 2016, Jordan sealed its borders to
Syrian refugees after a suicide bomber attacked the entry point at Rukban,
killing seven Jordanian military members and injuring 14 other personnel.97
As a result, there are an estimated 60,000 Syrians living in make-shift camps
along the border in an area designated by Jordan as an official “military
zone.”98 The Jordanian military does not permit humanitarian aid workers
into the military zone because it has been infiltrated by ISIS and is unsafe.99
Aid workers fear that the people stuck in what they call a “no man’s land”
are in danger of starvation.100
3.

Lebanon

The UNHCR estimates that there are almost 1 million Syrian refugees
currently living in Lebanon.101 Similar to Jordan, Lebanon is not a party to
the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol102 and has not enacted any domestic legislation specifically addressing the status of refugees.103 Refugee status is determined by the provisions of a 2003 MOU between Lebanon and

92. Id.
93. BIDINGER ET AL., supra note 88, at 55.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 69–70.
97. Jane Arraf, Along Syria-Jordan Border, Refugees Struggle at a Camp Aid Workers
Can’t Visit, NPR (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/03/20/
520857305/along-syria-jordan-border-refugees-struggle-at-a-camp-aid-workers-cant-visit.
98. Jordan: 70,000 Syrians Trapped at Border: Resume Food, Water, Medical Care for
Asylum Seekers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 1, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/01
/jordan-70000-syrians-trapped-border.
99. Arraf, supra note 96.
100. Id.
101. Syria Regional Refugee Response, UNHCR, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees
/country.php?id=122 (last visited Apr. 18, 2017).
102. Issam Saliba, Refugee Law and Policy: Lebanon, LIB. OF CONGRESS (Mar. 2016),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/lebanon.php.
103. Id.
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the UNHCR.104 Under the terms of the MOU, the Lebanese government
agreed to issue a temporary residence permit to asylum seekers and the
UNHCR works to find durable solutions for the refugees.105
Despite its MOU with the UNHCR, Lebanon has reversed its
longstanding open-door policy for Syrian nationals. In 2015, it began imposing visa-like restrictions on Syrians106 and has closed its border with Syria
on and off since 2013.107 In 2016, newly elected president, Michel Aoun,
called for Syrians to return to Syria despite the ongoing conflict.108 Aoun
and other political leaders in Lebanon have also supported the creation of
safe zones in Syria where refugees could return.109
B.

Europe

With limited prospects in the states of first asylum and closing borders,
a wave of Syrian refugees migrated into Europe in high numbers, either taking the Balkan Route110 or the risky journey across the Mediterranean Sea.111
In 2015 alone, it was estimated that more than one million migrants and
refugees arrived in Europe hoping to be granted asylum there.112 European
leaders are divided on how best to respond to the sudden influx of human
beings and took varying approaches to the crisis.113 Some European countries opened their doors to the refugees without limits; other countries limited the number of refugees they were willing to accept; and a number more
took measures to close their borders to refugees all together.114
104. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR COUNTRY
OPERATIONS PLAN 2004 – LEBANON 4 (2003).
105. Id.
106. Syria Events of 2016, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/
country-chapters/syria#634b1d (last visited Mar. 31, 2018).
107. Elena Fiddian-Quasmiyeh, Syrian Refugees in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon Face an
Uncertain 2017, REFUGEE HOSTS (Jan. 3, 2017), https://refugeehosts.org/2017/01/03/syrianrefugees-in-turkey-jordan-and-lebanon-face-an-uncertain-2017/.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. The Balkan Route into Europe begins in Turkey. From there migrants cross through
Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary before reaching Austria. See Europe Migrants: Tracing
Perilous Balkan Route to Germany, BBC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.bbc.com
/news/world-europe-34039968 [hereinafter Europe Migrants].
111. Data Team, Migration to Europe: Death at Sea—How Many Migrants Are Dying
Trying to Reach Europe?, ECONOMIST (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs
/graphicdetail/2015/09/migration-europe-0.
112. Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts, BBC NEWS (Mar.
4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911.
113. Ian Traynor and Nicholas Watt, European States Deeply Divided on Refugee Crisis
Before Key Summit, GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016
/feb/17/european-states-deeply-divided-on-refugee-crisis-ahead-of-summit.
114. Id.

2017]

SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

65

Twenty-eight of the forty-four European countries115 are members of
the European Union. Since 1999, the European Union (EU) has worked to
reform its asylum legislation to establish a Common European Asylum System (CEAS).116 Under the CEAS, protection is granted to migrants who
meet the criteria of a refugee based upon a well-founded fear of persecution.117 Subsidiary protection status is granted to migrants who do not meet
the refugee criteria but face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned
to his or her country of origin.118 The CEAS is made up of several directives
and regulations that require action by the EU Member States or are directly
applicable within their national legal systems. New rules have recently been
adopted by the parties, establishing standards and cooperation to ensure that
asylum seekers are treated equally throughout the EU.119
Despite efforts to create a consistent body of protections throughout the
EU, the Union was not prepared for the current refugee crisis and significant
division exists as to the best and most equitable way to resettle the refugees.120 The next section will discuss Hungary, the United Kingdom, and
Germany to illustrate the range of responses found in Europe and, more specifically, the EU, Hungary, and the United Kingdom took protective
measures to slow the influx of refugees. Adding to the chaos, Germany
opened its doors without placing limits on the number of refugees they were
willing to accept, causing a mass migration through the maze of open and
shut states to the German border.121

115. UNSD — Methodology, UNSTATS.UN.ORG, https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology
/m49/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
116. European Commission, Common European Asylum System, EUROPA.EU, https://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en (last updated Mar. 31, 2018).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. These revised regulations include the revised Asylum Procedures Directive, which
aims for fair and efficient asylum decisions; the revised Reception Conditions Directive,
which ensures humane reception and respect for fundamental rights of the asylum seekers
across the EU; the revised Qualification Directive which clarifies the grounds for granting
international protection; the revised Dublin Regulation which enhances the protection of
asylum seekers during the process of establishing the state responsible for examining the
application and clarifies the rules governing the relations between states; and the revised
Eurodac Regulation that allows law enforcement access to the EU database of the fingerprints
of asylum seekers under strictly limited circumstances in order to prevent, detect or investigate the most serious crimes, such as murder and terrorism. See id.
120. Understanding Migration and Asylum in the European Union, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND.,
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-migration-and-asylumeuropean-union (last updated Dec. 2016).
121. Rick Noack, Germany Said It Took in More than 1 Million Refugees Last Year. But
It Didn’t, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews
/wp/2016/09/30/germany-said-it-took-in-more-than-1-million-refugees-last-year-but-itdidnt/?utm_term=.b2c3e1bba421.
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Hungary

Hungary’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis is possibly the most
criticized by other members of the EU and human rights groups. In 2015,
Prime Minister Viktor and members of the Hungarian Cabinet declared a
state of emergency.122 The government installed razor wire fences on its
borders with Serbia and Croatia to stop the flow of thousands of refugees
and reinforced its borders with soldiers and police.123 Government officials
also instituted harsher penalties for illegal crossings, including jail time.124
Hungary is party to the 1951 Convention and the Optional Protocol.125
They are also a member of the EU126 and bound by the CEAS. Despite its
commitments under the Dublin Regulation,127 Hungary passed new legislation in March of 2017 authorizing the detention of asylum-seekers on its
borders until their applications are processed.128 Pending decision on their
cases, the asylum-seekers will be held in border camps and not be permitted
to move freely about the country. If they choose to leave Hungary, they are
only authorized to leave through a border gate to Serbia, a non-EU country
where the asylum-seekers cannot benefit from the Schengen agreement
which allows for free movement throughout Europe. 129

122. Jane Onyanga-Omara, Hungary Declares State of Emergency Amid Migrant Crisis,
USA TODAY (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/09/15
/hungary-migrants-state-of-emergency/72295914/.
123. Id.
124. Hungarian Refugee Detention Bill Comes into Force, WORLD BULL. (Mar. 28,
2017), http://www.worldbulletin.net/world/186989/hungarian-refugee-detention-bill-comesinto-force [hereinafter Detention Bill].
125. States parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the
1967 Protocol, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/3b73b0d63/statesparties-1951-convention-its-1967-protocol.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
126. EU Member Countries in Brief, EUROPEA.EU, https://europa.eu/europeanunion/about-eu/countries/member-countries_en (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).
127. The Dublin Regulation was created to determine which EU State is responsible for
examining an asylum application. This examination normally occurs in the State where the
asylum seeker first entered the EU and to ensure that all asylum claims get a fair examination
in one Member State. See The Dublin Regulation: Asylum in Europe—Now It’s Up to You,
UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/4a9d13d59.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2017).
128. Detention Bill, supra note 121. See Schengen Agreement, SCHENGEN VISA INFO,
http://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-agreement/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).
129. The Schengen Agreement allows for the free movement between many European
countries. Schengen Countries include: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Id.
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The United Kingdom

Despite its longstanding role in the development of international human rights law and commitment under the 1951 Convention and its Optional
Protocol, Britain has only pledged to accept 20,000 refugees over the course
of five years.130
The UK’s Immigration Act of 1971, and the Immigration Rules, create
the statutory basis for immigration law in the United Kingdom.131 Yet, these
laws are “fluid” and “change frequently.”132 This is significant because
changing opinion often coincides with changing refugee policy. For instance, the United Kingdom saw a drastic increase in the number of refugees
entering the country in the early 2000s. In 2002, the number of refugees
peaked with 84,132 cases filed. 133 The Parliament reacted by increasing the
difficulty of gaining refugee and asylum status in the United Kingdom and
decreasing the benefits allotted to each group.134 The United Kingdom has
also restricted the geographical areas where refugees and asylum seekers can
live, thus concentrating them into peripheral provinces. For instance, the two
areas with the highest number of refugees coincide with the nation’s poorest
districts.135 The United Kingdom also passed the Refugee or Person in Need
of International Protection Regulations in 2006, which amended the definition of a refugee from the 1951 Convention. The policy expanded on the
definition outlined in the 1951 Convention, adding that a refugee must have
no reasonable grounds to be considered a national threat where subsequent
refusal of his application would force him to leave to an area where he
would be threatened.136 These policy changes had startling results—in 2010,
the number of cases filed dropped to 17,916.137 Applicants who are successful in their claim for refugee status gain permission to reside in the United
Kingdom for a period of at least five years, with access to welfare benefits
and the right to work.138
130. Jon Stone, Britain Is Not Taking Enough Syrian Refugees, Peter Mandelson Says,
INDEP. (Mar. 1 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/britain-is-not-takingenough-syrian-refugees-peter-mandelson-says-a6904706.html.
131. Clare Feikert-Ahalt, Refugee Law and Policy: United Kingdom, LIB. OF CONGRESS
(Mar. 2016), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/unitedkingdom.php.
132. Id.
133. OLIVER HAWKINS, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR., ASYLUM STATISTICS 6 (2017),
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN01403#fullreport.
134. Stone, supra note 127.
135. Marginal Benefits, ECONOMIST (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/
britain/21692914-asylum-seekers-are-sent-poorest-parts-britain-what-happens-next-marginalbenefits.
136. Feikert-Ahalt, supra note 128.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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In response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, the United Kingdom developed a new program to address Syrian refugees seeking asylum and refugee
status in the United Kingdom. The new program, the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Refugee Scheme, allows particularly vulnerable Syrians, such as those
who are “victims of sexual violence and torture, the elderly, and the disabled” to come to the United Kingdom.139 Previously, the United Kingdom’s
policy was to continue to provide humanitarian aid to Syria and the surrounding countries. As a testament to their donor capability, the United
Kingdom is the second largest humanitarian donor to Syria and the surrounding region, donating approximately $1.85 billion per year to aid refugees.140
The Syrian Vulnerable Persons Refugee Scheme was expanded on September 7, 2015, to accept 20,000 Syrian refugees in the country over the
next five years.141 The program only applies to refugees who are in Syria
and the surrounding areas and does not consider refugees who are already in
Europe or are a part of another program. The program selects refugees from
a predetermined list provided by the UNHCR. Upon recommendation from
the UNHCR, the Home Office will conduct further checks on eligibility and
place refugee applicants into a suited internal program for resettlement.142
While the United Kingdom has made significant policy changes to accommodate an influx in refugees and has remained one of the largest donors
in support of refugees, increasing anti-refugee public sentiment poses a potential threat to future UK policies. One of the principal reasons for the British referendum in support of leaving the European Union was a fear that the
European Union was incapable of managing the refugee crisis, placing the
United Kingdom at a security risk.143
3.

Germany

Unlike many of its European partners, Germany opened its doors to
more than 890,000 refugees in August 2015.144 It was among 29 nations
accepting Syrian refugees at the time, but was one of the few that did not
place limits on the numbers it was willing to accept.145
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Feikert-Ahalt, supra note 128.
143. Jacob Poushter, European Opinions of the Refugee Crisis in 5 Charts, PEW RES.
CTR. (2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-therefugee-crisis-in-5-charts/.
144. Noack, supra note 118.
145. Casper Rigsby, Germany Opens Borders for Syrian Refugees, INQUISITR (Sept. 7,
2015), http://www.inquisitr.com/2398087/germany-opens-borders-for-syrian-refugees/.
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Germany is a party to both the 1951 Convention and 1967 Optional
Protocol.146 Its international commitment to asylum is incorporated into its
federal law. Specifically, Article 16a of Germany’s Basic Law states that the
right to asylum is a constitutional right granted to everyone fleeing “political
persecution.”147 In addition, Germany has implemented two acts concerning
the status of refugees—the Asylum Act, which codifies the process and consequences of granting and denying asylum, and the Residence Act, which
provides the rules concerning the entry, stay, exit, and employment of foreigners. According to German law, an asylum seeker is allowed to stay in
Germany so long as he or she is granted political asylum, refugee status, or
subsidiary protection.148
In August 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel pledged to provide
refuge to anyone fleeing Syria or persons seeking protection from violence
and warfare elsewhere.149 Chancellor Merkel’s “open door” policy was modified in February 2016, when the German government passed the Asylum
Procedures Acceleration Act, also known as “Asylpaket II,” which was designed to accelerate the asylum process in Germany and reform integration
policies for refugees.150 Under Asylpaket II, more Syrians were able to attend hearings and it became apparent that many were fleeing civil war and
not actual persecution. As a result, many Syrian refugees now receive subsidiary protection instead of full asylum.151 Subsidiary protection is granted
to those who cannot show that they have been personally persecuted, such as
those fleeing general situations like civil war. Although Germany will not
send Syrians nationals back to their war-torn country, persons only entitled
to subsidiary protection status receive a renewable one-year-permit and are
required to wait two years before being allowed to bring their families to
Germany.152 According to Die Linke, an opposition party in Germany’s parliament, a total of 43,300 Syrians have appealed their status decisions in
hopes of being recognized as a refugee.153

146. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23.
147. Jenny Gesley, Refugee Law and Policy: Germany, LIB. OF CONGRESS (Mar. 2016),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/germany.php.
148. Id.
149. Nicola Abé et al., Mother Angela: Merkel’s Refugee Policy Divides Europe,
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugeepolicy-of-chancellor-merkel-divides-europe-a-1053603.html.
150. Jenny Gesley, supra note 144.
151. Bleiker Carla, Thousands of Refugees Are Suing Germany, DW.COM (Apr. 1, 2017),
http://www.dw.com/en/thousands-of-refugees-are-suing-germany/a-37004504.
152. Id.
153. Christina Ruta, Germany’s Revamped Asylum Law, One Year Later, DW.COM (Feb.
26, 2017), http://www.dw.com/en/germanys-revamped-asylum-law-one-year-later/a-3772
2393.
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North America and Beyond

Most countries are geographically separated from the Syrian conflict,
thus spared from the influx of refugees seen in the states of first asylum in
the Middle East and later in Europe. In recognition of the heavy burden
placed upon certain countries, other states are bound to cooperate toward a
“satisfactory solution.”154 Unfortunately, there has been limited international
burden-sharing of refugee resettlement. Some countries have accepted modest amounts, but many countries have not agreed to accept any Syrian refugees for resettlement. This list below discusses the immigration policies of
Canada and the United States. Afterwards, notable countries that are currently not accepting Syrian refugees will be discussed briefly.
1.

Canada

Similar to Britain and Germany, Canada has a longstanding history of
commitment and compliance with international refugee law. Canada is party
to the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Internally, Canada has adopted numerous statutes, which create a robust refugee and asylum system
where almost 100 percent of claimants receive a formal hearing and free
legal advice.155
In May 2001, the Canadian Parliament passed the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act.156 It was created “to permit Canada to pursue the
maximum social, cultural and economic benefits of immigration . . . “157 The
current Canadian refugee system is composed of the Refugee Humanitarian
Resettlement Program and the In-Canada Asylum Program. The Refugee
Humanitarian Resettlement Program assists applicants who are actively
seeking protection from areas outside of Canada. The In-Canada Asylum
Program assists individual seeking refugee protection claims from within
Canada.158 Unlike other countries, private organizations play an important
role in refugee resettlement in Canada, through programs such as the Sponsorship Agreement Holders program and Groups of Five.159 These groups all
seek to provide refugees placement and other necessities. Private sponsorship helps to ease the transition of refugees from life in refugee camps to
154. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23.
155. James Bissett, Canada’s Asylum System: A Threat to American Security?, CTR. FOR
IMMIGR. STUD. (May 1, 2012), http://cis.org/articles/2002/back402.html.
156. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, R.S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Can.).
157. Id.
158. How Canada’s Refugee System Works, GOV’T OF CAN., http://www.cic.gc.ca/
ENGLISH/refugees/canada.asp (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
159. Canadaʼs Sponsorship System, ORCA, http://orcabc.org/canadas-sponsorshipsystem/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
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normalcy in Canada. These programs also aid refugees and communities by
decreasing the initial strain on the community from refugee placement. All
benefits afforded to refugees underneath private programs are in addition to
government assistance and enable Canadians to ensure protection and permanent housing to refugees who may not have received the opportunity.160
In recent years, Canada has increased its refugee intake to ease the burden of refugees from the Syrian Civil War and other conflicts. Between
2005 and 2014, Canada accepted 263,702 refugees.161 Despite the rise in
refugee acceptance, Canada still maintained a strong economy and other
factors indicative of a thriving state. In response to the heightened severity
of the Syrian Refugee Crisis, Canada increased its acceptance of Syrian refugees in late 2015 and implemented new legislation to ameliorate the strain
Syrian refugees placed on their already extended refugee programs. Toward
the end of 2015, the Canadian government announced that “[Canada] would
resettle 10,000 Syrian refugees by the end of 2015 and another 15,000 by
the end of February 2016.”162 On February 29, 2016, the Canadian government had reached their intended target. To implement this plan, Canada
worked extensively with the UNHCR to “identify people in Jordan and Lebanon,” who were considered low-risk refugees, and accepted them into Canada’s Resettlement Program.163 Single, unaccompanied men were excluded
from the program, placing preference on women, children, and the disabled.164
2.

The United States

The United States joined the international refugee regime in 1968 by
ratifying the 1967 Optional Protocol to the 1951 Convention on the Status of
Refugees.165 Refugee admissions and resettlement into the United States is
authorized and governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.),

160. Tariq Ahmad, Refugee Law and Policy: Canada, LIB. OF CONGRESS (Mar. 2016)
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/canada.php.
161. Daniel Schwartz, Canada’s Refugees by the Numbers: The Data, CBC NEWS (Oct. 4,
2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canada-s-refugees-by-the-numbers-the-data-1.324064
0.
162. Ahmad, supra note 157.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 Berkeley J.
of Int’l L. 1, 1 n.1 (1997) (“Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967,
entered into force Oct. 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol]. US ratification of the Protocol bound it to respect Articles 2 through 34 of
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, entered into
force Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 137”).
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which was amended by the Refugee Act of 1980.166 The 1980 Act, which
was passed to end the ad hoc approach characteristic of U.S. refugee policy
dating back to WWII, aimed to create a uniform procedure for refugee admissions and to authorize federal assistance for refugee resettlement and
promote refugee self-sufficiency.167
Modeled after the definition found in the 1951 Convention, a “refugee”
is described under the I.N.A. as a person who is outside his or her country
and who is unable or unwilling to return because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.168
Refugees are processed and admitted to the United States from outside
the country with the help of UNHCR.169 The UNHCR has first contact with
the refugees outside of the United States. They assess individual refugee
claims and, in some cases, refer the case to the United States (or other nations) for resettlement. In addition to interviewing refugees, the UNHCR
collects biometric data and seeks to determine if the refugees fall into one of
45 categories of concern.170
Under the INA, the President has the power to determine the number of
refugees admitted into the United States after appropriate consultation with
Congress and prior to the new fiscal year. The President makes this determination based upon humanitarian concerns or other national security interests.171 In the case of an unforeseen refugee situation that cannot be accommodated by the existing ceiling, the President is also granted the power to
fix a number of refugees that may be admitted during the succeeding period
in response to that emergency.172 Conversely, the INA also grants the President the power to suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as
immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate, if he finds that the entry of any

166. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§1101 et seq.); Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
167. Anastasia Brown & Todd Scribner, Unfulfilled Promises, Future Possibilities: The
Refugee Resettlement System in the United States, 2 J. ON MIGRATION AND HUM.
SECURITY 101, 102 (2014).
168. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42) (2014).
169. See Who We Help, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/who-we-help.html (last
visited Dec. 19, 2017). In contrast, an asylum seeker is a person who meets the refugee criteria, but is physically present in the United States.
170. Molly O’Toole, Are Refugees Really a ‘National Security’ Threat to America?,
UNHCR (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5
&id=561b46b25.
171. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3).
172. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b).
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aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to
the interests of the United States.173
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United
States refugee program was significantly updated to ensure national security
despite the fact that none of the attackers had entered the country as a refugee.174 Refugee admissions were suspended pending a review of refugeerelated security procedures and implementation of enhanced security
measures.175 As an obvious result, United States refugee admissions plummeted from 70,000 in fiscal year 2001 to historic lows. In fiscal year 2002,
for example, refugee admissions totaled a mere 27,131.176 Admissions subsequently rebounded with resettlements nearing the 70,000 ceiling set for
fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2015.177
By mid-2015, the Syrian Refugee crisis had reached the shores of Europe, with an estimated 350,000 seeking refuge beyond the camps of Jordan,
Turkey, and Lebanon.178 Under significant pressure from the international
community to assist with resettlement, President Barack Obama vowed to
take in at least 10,000 displaced Syrians over the next year. He issued a
Presidential Determination increasing the refugee ceiling to 85,000179 and by
173. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2013).
174. MICHELLE MITTELSTADT ET AL., THROUGH THE PRISM OF NATIONAL SECURITY:
MAJOR IMMIGRATION POLICY AND PROGRAM CHANGES IN THE DECADE SINCE 9/11 1 (Migrant
Policy Institute 2011).
175. ANDORRA BRUNO, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND RESETTLEMENT POLICY 2 (2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31269.pdf.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Krishnadev Calamur, The U.S. Response to Syria’s Refugee Crisis: The White House
Says It Is Preparing to Accept at Least 10,000 Refugees in the Next Fiscal
Year, ATLANTIC (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/09/theus-response-to-syrias-refugees/404728/.
179. Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Determination -- Presidential Determination
on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2016, OBAMAWHITEHOUSE.ARCHIVES.GOV (Sept. 29,
2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/29/presidential-dete
rmination-presidential-determination-refugee-admissions. The Determination does not specifically state that 10,000 Syrian refugee will be admitted. Instead, it states more generally that
“[t]he admissions numbers shall be allocated among refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States in accordance with the following regional allocations; provided
that the number of admissions allocated to the East Asia region shall include persons admitted to the United States during FY 2016 with Federal refugee resettlement assistance
under section 584 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 1988, as contained in section 101(e) of Public Law 100-202 (Amerasian immigrants and their family members): Africa 25,000, East Asia 13,000; Europe and
Central Asia 4,000; Latin America/Caribbean 3,000; Near East/South Asia 34,000; Unallocated Reserve 6,000. The 6,000 unallocated refugee numbers shall be allocated to regional
ceilings, as needed. Upon providing notification to the Judiciary Committees of the Congress, you are hereby authorized to use unallocated admissions in regions where the need
for additional admissions arises.” Id.

74

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

August 29, 2016 the United States accepted its 10,000th Syrian refugee one
month ahead of schedule.180 Vowing to do more in 2017, President Obama
increased the fiscal year 2017 ceiling to 110,000 in his September 28, 2016
Presidential Declaration.181 By December of 2016, the United States was ontrack to reach the 2017 ceiling, with an estimated 26,000 refugees having
been accepted during the first quarter.182
After taking office in January 2017, President Trump exercised his
powers under 1182(f).183 On January 30, 2017, he issued an order calling for
a 90-day travel ban for persons coming from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen and Libya. Specifically relevant to refugees, the order placed a
120 day suspension on acceptance of all refugees regardless of origin and an
indefinite suspension on refugees traveling from Syria.184 It also reduced the
fiscal year 2017 ceiling from 110,000 to 50,000.185 After significant political
backlash and legal action, he issued a revised order on March 6, 2017. The
new order retained the 120-day suspension on refugees, but it removed the
indefinite suspension for Syrian refugees. Additionally, the order also retained the reduction in the fiscal year ceiling and limited the number of accepted refugees to 50,000.186 At the time the order was issued, the United
States had accepted 37,027 refugees; 5,557 of those refugees were Syrian.187
Now that the 120-day suspension has been lifted, the United States will open
its doors for a mere 12,973 refugees in the remainder of the fiscal year.
While critics complain that the United States, the United Kingdom, or
even Canada should do more to help the Syrian refugees, it must be noted
that those countries have at least opened their doors to some refugees. Most
countries across the globe, including some of the wealthiest, have not done
the same. For example, Japan was the second largest contributor of financial
support to the UNHCR in 2014, donating the equivalent of $181.6 mil-

180. Allie Malloy, Elise Labott & Laura Koran, US Welcomes Its 10,000th Syrian Refugee Ahead of Schedule, CNN (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/28/politics/
syrian-refugees-resettling-us-obama-administration/.
181. Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Determination–Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017, OBAMAWHITEHOUSE.ARCHIVES.GOV (Sept. 28, 2016), https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/28/presidential-determination-refugeeadmissions-fiscal-year-2017.
182. Phillip Connor & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. on Track to Reach Obama Administration’s Goal of Resettling 110,000 Refugees this Year, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 20, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/20/u-s-on-track-to-reach-obamaadministrations-goal-of-resettling-110000-refugees-this-year/.
183. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
184. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
185. Id.
186. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
187. Admissions & Arrivals, REFUGEE PROCESSING CTR., http://www.wrapsnet.org/admiss
ions-and-arrivals/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
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lion.188 Despite its significant financial contribution, Japan only accepted six
Syrian asylum seekers who made it to Japan and not a single refugee for
resettlement from the states of first asylum.189 Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe justified his country’s inaction by explaining that Japan needed
to look after its own citizens first.190 Similarly, Russia has contributed to
military action in Syria, but it has offered zero resettlement places for Syrian
refugees. Russian officials unapologetically explained that receiving Syrian
refugees is simply not on the Russian agenda.191
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE PATCHWORK OF STATE REFUGEE LAWS AND
POLICIES
“EXPRESSING the wish that all States, recognizing the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything within
their power to prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension
between States . . .”192

The Syrian refugee crisis has trampled the Middle East, cost thousands
of innocent lives, exhausted the resources of neighboring states and damaged the foundation of the European Union. Despite the devastating toll on
humanity and potential for disastrous results, many nations cling to state
sovereignty and national security to justify their opposition to more generous refugee resettlement policies, while other nations have opened their borders, at times encouraging thousands of asylum seekers to move through
Europe with little, if any, screening. Ultimately, both approaches pose a
significant threat to international security by allowing some states to become
overwhelmed and encouraging irregular migration to surge and extremist
rhetoric to flourish.
A.

Overburdened States of First Asylum

Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon are stretched beyond the limits of their
resources. The infrastructure, including water, sewage, electricity, and edu-

188. Adam Taylor, Japan Has Accepted Only Six Syrian Refugees. Meet One of Them,
WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/thesingular-life-of-a-syrian-refugee-in-japan/2016/10/26/be0c6699-09f3-4a05-abebcad076b4cc02_story.html?utm_term=.34847f8e366a.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Russia: Failing to Do Fair Share to Help Syrian Refugees, HUM. RTS. WATCH,
(Sept. 14, 2016) https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/14/russia-failing-do-fair-share-helpsyrian-refugees.
192. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23, preamble.
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cation, of these states is overwhelmed.193 As a direct consequence of the
overcrowding and limited financial opportunities in the first line states, the
refugees have naturally begun migrating to Europe in large numbers. Since
2015, Germany has opened its doors to more than 1,000,000 refugees, not
only from Syria, but from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Eritrea. Greece was overrun by more than 800,000 Syrian refugees in 2016. Italy is overwhelmed
with refugees escaping persecution and failed states in Africa.194 The number of refugees is staggering, leaving the host nations on the brink of disruption to their political order.195 Given the sheer number of refugees in their
territories, countries are struggling to ensure refugees receive adequate protection afforded under the 1951 Convention or UDHR.196 Further adding to
the instability, tensions between the local populations and the refugees is on
the rise, and many states are opting to close their borders.
1.

Human Rights Concerns

Many, and perhaps most, of the Syrian refugees are living in desperate
conditions, even those who have made it to Europe. The United Nations
estimates that only one out of every ten Syrian refugees lives in a refugee
camp, leaving the rest to settle in foreign and unfamiliar environments.197
Their locations vary, spanning from cities to towns, urban to rural areas. Out
of camp, refugees are faced with a range of shelter conditions, and varied
access to services. In Lebanon, for example, many refugees live in informal
settlements in crude shelters with limited access to water and sanitation services. Of particular concern to human rights organizations, many of those
refugees are living in flood zones and or unstable areas with the potential for
conflict.198 Their precarious circumstances make them highly susceptible to
protective risks and economic pressures.199
193. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF ET AL., THE UNITED STATES AND THE SYRIAN REFUGEE
CRISIS: A PLAN OF ACTION (2016).
194. Id. at 3.
195. Id. at 8.
196. Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey do not have legal obligations to the Syrian refugees pursuant to the 1951 Convention or the Optional Protocol; however, they are bound to
protect the fundamental human rights as reflected in the UDHR. The UDHR is considered to
be a statement of customary international law. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 287, 323–24 (1995).
197. Mercy Corps, Quick Facts: What You Need to Know About the Syria Crisis (Mar. 9,
2017)
https://www.mercycorps.org/articles/iraq-jordan-lebanon-syria-turkey/quick-factswhat-you-need-know-about-syria-crisis.
198. JEFF CRISP ET AL., FROM SLOW BOIL TO BREAKING POINT: A REAL-TIME EVALUATION
(2013),
OF UNHCR’S RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN REFUGEE EMERGENCY 13
http://www.unhcr.org/52b83e539.pdf.
199. Id. at 3.
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Life in the refugee camps is not always better than in the settlements.
By most reports, the conditions in refugee camps are deplorable. The camps
are overcrowded and often lack running water, electricity, and other necessities,200 leaving the refugees trapped in an environment arguably worse than
their war-torn homeland. For example, refugees at Domeez camp in Iraq
were found to be at high risk of contracting communicable diseases such as
measles and meningitis, due to extreme overcrowding.201 Doctors determined that camp conditions were inadequate and residents did not have access to clean water.202 Conditions in Greek refugee camps are even more
alarming. A recent report from the Refugee Rights Data Project indicates
that refugees’ personal security, health, and wellbeing are at risk.203 Despite
cold temperatures, refugees are still living in summer-weight tents, which
pose a significant fire threat.204 Camp residents lack privacy, basic necessities, and are exposed to raw sewage.205 NGO workers also report that women and children have gone missing, probably falling victim to human traffickers.206 In Jordan, camps are run by the government and the United Nations, offering more structure and support than other countries, but many
families still feel trapped in the overcrowded situation.207
Employment opportunities for the Syrian refugees are limited by many
of the host nations. In 2016, Turkey and Jordan finally agreed to issue Syrian nationals work permits, but only did so in exchange for financial aid and
other economic benefits.208 However, employers apply for the permits on
behalf of Syrian employees after their residency, registration, and health
requirements are met.209 In both countries, employers agree to pay minimum

200. See Finding Solutions for Syrian Refugees: Resettlement, Humanitarian Admission,
and Family Reunification, UNHCR (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.refugee.org.uk/sites/
default/files/Fact%20sheet%20on%20resettlement-humanitarian%20admissions%20
Syrian%20refugees%20-%2018%20D%20%20.pdf.
201. Id.
202. Medicins sans Frontieres, Iraq: Poor Living Conditions in Domeez Camp Put Health
of Syrian Refugees at Risk (May 15, 2013), http://www.msf.org/en/article/iraq-poor-livingconditions-domeez-camp-put-health-syrian-refugees-risk.
203. Rachel Banning-Lover, Greek Refugee Camps Remain Dangerous and Inadequate,
Say Aid Workers, GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment-professionals-network/2017/feb/10/greek-refugee-camps-dangerousinadequate-aid-workers.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Mercy Corps, supra note 194.
208. Omer Karasapan, Syrian Refugees and the Promise of Work Permits, BROOKINGS
INST. (June 20, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2016/06/20/
syrian-refugees-and-the-promise-of-work-permits/.
209. Id.

78

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

wage and social security payments, and to renew the permits annually.210
Unfortunately, there is little incentive for the employers to take these steps
since the majority of Syrian nationals in these countries are willing to work
in low-skill, low-wage labor markets where the pay is below the minimum
wage.211 As a result, a large percentage of the Syrian refugees continue to
live in acute poverty in Turkey and Jordan.212 In Lebanon, Syrian nationals
are obligated to pay a prohibitive fee annually to work. As a result, adults
either do not work or work illegally, risking deportation if caught.213
Education prospects for Syrian children in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon are also grim. It is currently estimated that there are 1.5 million schoolage children among the Syrian refugee population living in the states of first
asylum. Of that 1.5 million, only half have access to formal education.214
While host nations have taken steps to increase refugee enrollment, barriers
such as language difficulties, transportation, religious accommodation, child
marriage, and child labor keep children out of the classroom.215 Alarming
recent statistics indicate rates of child marriage among refugee girls have
doubled from 12% to 26%.216 Child labor among out-of-school children is
rapidly worsening—one recent survey estimates that a third of the displaced
children have become laborers, often working illegally in dangerous environments.217 In light of the poor prospects in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan,
many families opt to make what one writer describes as the “death voyage”
to Europe where educational opportunities are better.218
2.

Risk of Radicalization

Slow refugee resettlement also means many Syrian refugees will remain in refugee camps longer, which under the wrong conditions, increases
the risk of radicalization. Many national security experts argue the refugee
camps, in particular, are “incubators and recruitment centers for jihad ex210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, supra note 104. According to Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 38% of Syrians
in Turkey live in the poorest regions of that country where employment opportunities are at
their worst. She also indicates that 93% of the Syrians living in Jordan, regardless of location,
fall under the poverty line.
213. Id.
214. Education
for
Syrian
Refugee
Children,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/tag/education-syrian-refugee-children (last visited Mar. 31, 2018).
215. See SHELLY CULBERTSON & LOUAY CONSTANT, EDUCATION OF SYRIAN REFUGEE
CHILDREN (2015), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR859.html.
216. Gordon Brown, Without Education Syrian Children Will Be a Lost Generation,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/12/syriarefugee-children-lebanon-double-shift-schools.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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tremism.” 219 Fran Townsend, the former Assistant to President George W.
Bush for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and former Chair of the
Homeland Security Council recently stated, “[t]o not bring the [Syrian] refugees in, right, you leave these people in desperate circumstances and you
see the battlefield [sic] that are the refugee camps to the recruitment of ISIS,
[and] al Qaeda over the long term.”220 In addition to evidence of Islamic
State activity within camps, the above-mentioned human rights concerns
increase the risk of radicalization. A recent RAND study evaluated factors
that tend to foster radicalization and determined that six of those proved
significant across the “worst cases” studied. Five of the six factors on their
list are relevant to the Syrian refugee crisis including: host nation limits on
refugees’ rights and opportunities; inadequate security in and around camps;
overcrowded and unsanitary living conditions; poor host nation economic
situations; and limited education opportunities.221 The longer refugees are
confined in these camps, with substandard living conditions and poor employment prospects, the higher the risk that they may become discouraged
and susceptible to radicalization.222
3.

Tensions with Local Population

Initially, the response to the Syrian refugees in the first-line countries
was welcoming and generous, especially considering that most are not party
to the Refugee Convention.223 Unfortunately, “as the influx has continued,
infrastructure and services for health, education, shelter, water and sanitation have faced increased pressure; competition for jobs has increased and
wages have fallen; and the cost of basic goods has risen.”224 Left unaddressed, experts predict “the strain will feed instability and trigger more
violence across the region, which will have consequences for U.S. national
security.”225 These negative side-effects have fueled tensions between the
219. IGNATIEFF ET AL., supra note 190.
220. Interview by John Dickerson with Fran Townsend, former Homeland Security Advisor to George W. Bush, FACE THE NATION (Nov. 22, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com
/news/face-the-nation-transcripts-november-22-feinstein-mccaul-mcgurk-paul/.
221. BARBARA SUDE, DAVID STEBBINS & SARAH WEILANT, LESSENING THE RISK OF
REFUGEE RADICALIZATION: LESSONS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST FROM PAST CRIMES 5 (2015).
222. Id. at 11.
223. POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION SERVICE, FROM SLOW BOIL TO BREAKING
POINT: A REAL-TIME EVALUATION OF UNHCR’S RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN REFUGEE
EMERGENCY 3 (2013).
224. Id.
225. Ryan C. Crocker, Opinion, The Case for Accepting Syrian Refugees: The U.S. Vetting System Is Strong, and so Is the American Tradition of Welcoming the Oppressed, WALL
STREET. J. (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-case-for-accepting-syrianrefugees-1447803302. Crocker is a former ambassador to several Middle Eastern countries
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local population and the refugees. Sadly, a rise in xenophobic offenses has
been documented even in the most accepting countries. For example, Germany noted 3,500 attacks against refugees in 2016, up from 1,031 in
2015.226 Of that number, 420 incidents were physical attacks upon refugees,
including children, and 750 were acts of arson or property damage.227
B.

Jihadist Narrative

Experts caution that such hostility toward the refugees can be easily
exploited by jihadists.228 The Islamic State sees the flight of Syrian refugees
out of its controlled territory as a significant threat to the legitimacy of its
so-called caliphate.229 They have appealed to the Syrian nationals to return
by trying to convince them that they will be abused by the ‘infidels’ and
forced to convert.230 Since it has failed to slow the mass exodus, the Islamic
State is working to create a backlash against Syrian refugees in Europe and
elsewhere. 231 By using “terror as a tool,” they build upon Western fears and
suspicions of people from Muslim countries.232 So, they attack civilians in
the streets of Paris, Brussels, London, or Orlando. The resulting intolerance
and xenophobia has led to immigration restrictions, which in turn has sent a
dangerous message that Muslim refugees are unwelcomed in the West.
State action, such as closing borders to the Syrian refugees, also reinforces the jihadist narrative that the West conspires to oppress Muslims
across the world.233 As Madeleine Albright, Henry Kissinger, David Petraeus, and other security experts argued in a joint letter to the U.S. Congress,
“[c]ategorically refusing to take [refugees] only feeds the narrative of ISIS
that there is a war between Islam and the West, that Muslims are not welcome in the United States and Europe, and that the ISIS caliphate is their
and current Dean of the George Bush School of Government & Public Service at Texas
A&M University. Id.
226. Simon Cullen & Susannah Cullinane, Germany: Thousands of Migrants Targeted in
Attacks, CNN (Feb. 27, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/27/europe/germany-attacks-onmigrants/index.html.
227. Id.
228. SUDE & STEBBINS, supra note 218, at 12.
229. Donald Kerwin, Treating Syrian Refugees as a National Security Threat: Do the
Means Fit the End?, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD. (2016), http://cmsny.org/publications
/kerwin-syrians-national-security/.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Ana Diamond, Closing the Borders Won’t Help Fight Terrorism, HARV. KENNEDY
SCH. REV. (Feb. 24, 2017), http://harvardkennedyschoolreview.com/closing-the-borderswont-help-fight-terrorism/.
233. Jared Malsin, Experts Warn President Trump’s Refugee Ban Could Backfire: ISIS
‘Rubbing Their Hands with Glee’, TIME (Jan. 28, 2017), http://time.com/4651729/presidenttrump-refugee-suspension-backfire/.
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true home.”234 Anti-immigration policies provide the Islamic State with an
opportunity to fill the void and advance its agendas across the region,235 adding more fuel to the jihadist propaganda machine, and allowing them to lure
new followers.236 “If anything it’s going to antagonize the narratives of terrorists. They’re going to use this as further indication that we have a war
with Islam, and they’ll use that for marketing purposes.”237
C.

Irregular Migration

In addition to the dangers posed by overburdened nations and actions
that feed into the jihadist narrative, another significant danger to individual,
state, and international security is the irregular migration that is encouraged,
in part, by inconsistent immigration policies. While there is no universally
accepted definition of irregular migration, the term is often used to characterize “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of sending,
transit and receiving countries.”238
Denying legal migration allows human traffickers access to vulnerable
persons, it increases crossing deaths, and makes it difficult for states to identify persons seeking admission into their territory.239 Hundreds of thousands
of Syrians desperate for better conditions have made the dangerous journey
to Europe. To do so, it is estimated that almost 90% of the refugees paid
criminals or smugglers to get them across borders, bypassing lawful channels.240 Thousands have not survived the journey. In August of 2015, the
bodies of 71 people believed to be Syrian nationals were found in an abandoned truck in Austria, and at least 300 were feared dead after trying to
cross the rough seas of the Mediterranean in February of 2016.241 Those who
survive the irregular migration journey frequently report being victims of
exploitation, violence, or abuse by their traffickers.242
234. Letter from twenty national security leaders, including Henry Kissinger, General
David Patraeus (Ret.), Michael Chertoff, Madeleine Albright, and Leon Panetta to Members
of Congress dated Dec. 1, 2015.
235. Diamond, supra note 229.
236. Malsin, supra note 230.
237. Id. Prior to his current position, Clint Watts was an FBI counterterrorism special
agent and U.S. Army infantry officer. Id.
238. Key Migration Terms, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, https://www.iom.int/keymigration-terms (last visited Dec. 26, 2017).
239. Donald Kerwin, How Robust Refugee Protection Policies Can Strengthen Human
and National Security, 4(3) J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 83, 119 (2016).
240. The European Commission, The EU and the Migration Crisis (July 2017),
http://publications.europa.eu/webpub/com/factsheets/refugee-crisis/en/.
241. Why Is EU Struggling with Migrants and Asylum, BBC NEWS (Mar. 3 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24583286.
242. Id.
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By 2015, European states determined that trying to stop the relentless
flow of Syrian asylum-seekers was futile and harmful. Led by Germany,
members of the EU worked together to allow the unscreened masses to proceed to the countries in which they wanted to seek asylum.243 By the end of
that year, it was estimated that more than one million refugees had arrived in
Europe by way of sea routes or the Balkans crossing.244 Instead of regulating
the flow, entry states accelerated refugee travel with little to no screening to
other countries like Germany, where the borders were open to an unlimited
number of asylum-seekers. While most of the refugees were simply trying to
get to a safe place, the poorly regulated flow made it easy for potential jihadists to get onto European soil undetected.245 DW, a German news agency, indicates that members of the Islamic State have “explored and exploited” the Balkan route into Europe, including two of the assailants in the Paris
attacks.246
In 2016, EU support for the uncontrolled migration waned as hostility
toward the refugees increased. Many countries, including Hungary, Serbia,
Macedonia, and Austria began building fences to slow the influx of refugees
into their countries.247 In March 2016, the EU abruptly changed course and
negotiated an agreement with Turkey to stop refugees from moving onward
into Europe in exchange for significant financial support.248 Unfortunately,
that agreement failed to close the border and refugees again have to pay
smugglers to get them across borders.
Frustrated with restrictive policies, many refugees have begun protesting and, in some cases, resorted to violence. In Greece, one man set himself
ablaze to protest the deplorable living conditions.249 In Jordan, protests
commonly occur in the Zaatari refugee camp over poor conditions. In the
same camp, a refugee was killed during a riot that occurred after police arrested a group of refugees who were trying to leave the camp. In Bulgaria,
refugees clashed with police after their refugee center was sealed off following reports alleging outbreaks of disease among camp residents.250 The new243. Understanding Migration and Asylum in the European Union, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND.,
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-migration-and-asylumeuropean-union (last updated Dec. 2016).
244. HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE, SYRIAN REFUGEE FLOWS: SECURITY RISKS AND
COUNTERTERRORISM CHALLENGES 7 (2015).
245. Id.
246. The Risk of Open Borders, DW.COM (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/therisk-of-open-borders/a-19496770.
247. Why Is EU Struggling with Migrants and Asylum, supra note 238.
248. OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., supra note 240.
249. Banning-Lover, supra note 200.
250. Poor Conditions Lead to Refugee Protest in Bulgaria, WORLD BULL. (Nov. 24,
2016), http://www.worldbulletin.net/haber/180645/poor-conditions-lead-to-refugees-protestin-bulgaria.

2017]

SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

83

ly constructed walls and changing immigration policies of overwhelmed
countries have only served to make the situation more volatile. All of the
resulting tension reinforces the jihadist narrative. The Syrian refugee crisis
proves the international refugee regime is inadequate in the face of large
scale forced migrations.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: A SECOND OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE 1951
CONVENTION
On the Status of Refugees
“CONSIDERING that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy
burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international-scope
and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international cooperation . . .”251

Former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, recently acknowledged that [Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon] “are crucial pillars
of peace and stability in their regions, and with conflicts and terrorism
threatening to spill across borders, they de facto form the first line of defense for our collective security.”252 After five years of carrying the unduly
heavy burden, it is unrealistic to expect that the states of first asylum in the
Middle East, and now a handful in Europe, can continue to absorb the seemingly endless flow of refugees. Humanitarian aid and financial support from
countries like Japan253 does not offer a satisfactory solution to the problem,
especially given the protracted nature of the Syrian crisis. The rest of the
international community must share the burden of refugee resettlement, humanitarian admission, and family reunification.254
Over the last seventy years, the world has seen horrific refugee situations unfold, yet no legal mechanism exists to allocate burden-sharing responsibilities among states. Burden-sharing, the process by which a third
country affords refugees permanent residence and rights similar to nationals,255 is only done on a voluntary basis. Given the voluntary nature, international resettlement has fallen below the need identified by the UNHCR. In
251. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 23, at Preamble.
252. António Guterres, Opening Remarks at the 66th Session of the Executive Committee
of the High Commissioner’s Programme, UNHCR (Oct. 5, 2015), www.unhcr.org/
admin/hcspeeches/56122bd76/opening-remarks-66thsession-executive-committee-highcommissionersprogramme.html.
253. Taylor, supra note 185.
254. Finding Solutions for Syrian Refugees, supra note 197.
255. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, The Strategic Use of
Resettlement (A Discussion Paper Prepared by the Working Group on Resettlement), (Jun. 3,
2003), http://www.refworld.org/docid/41597a824.html.
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2015, for example, the UNHCR identified 1.1 million refugees for resettlement, but it only had the ability to process resettlement submissions for
59,563 of those refugees.256 The UNHCR also reported that there are approximately 7.2 million refugees living in a protracted refugee situation,
which means they have been in exile for five or more years without the hope
of a durable solution.257 Based on these numbers from 2015, voluntary resettlement commitments from states, it would take more than 87 years to resettle all refugees currently eligible for resettlement.
Voluntary burden-sharing is not a sufficient solution. The world needs
a Second Optional Protocol establishing a predictable and equitable burdensharing agreement among states. Fortunately, there is some international
momentum moving toward a binding burden-sharing agreement. In 2000 at
the Millennium Summit and again in 2016 at the UN Summit for Refugees
and Migrants, world leaders acknowledged a collective responsibility to
protect refugees around the world.
A.

Millennium Declaration

In September of 2000, leaders of the international community gathered
at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations to set the international
agenda for the twenty-first century. The most important result was the creation of the Millennium Declaration, a document that reaffirmed states’ faith
in the United Nations and recognized a collective responsibility to uphold
human dignity, equality, and equity.258 Article VI of the Declaration reflects
the states’ commitment to protect the vulnerable from the “consequences of
natural disasters, genocide, armed conflicts and other humanitarian emergencies” and “are given every assistance and protection so that they can
resume normal life as soon as possible.”259 Pursuant to that objective, the
states resolved to “strengthen international cooperation, including burden
sharing in, and the coordination of humanitarian assistance to, countries
hosting refugees and to help all refugees and displaced persons to return
voluntarily to their homes, in safety and dignity and to be smoothly reintegrated into their societies.”260 Despite agreeing to share the burden that refugees place upon hosting countries, the states did not provide specific instruction on how that should be done.

256. JAMES MILNER, WHEN NORMS ARE NOT ENOUGH: UNDERSTANDING THE
AND PRACTICE OF BURDEN AND RESPONSIBILITY SHARING FOR REFUGEES 5 (2016).
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New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants

In September 2016, members of the international community met at the
UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants. That event marked the first time the
General Assembly called for a summit at the head-of-state-level to discuss
large movements of refugees and migrants.261 During that Summit, the General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, a document expressing the “political will of world leaders to save
lives, protect rights and share responsibility on a global scale.”262 While the
Declaration is not a binding agreement, it does call for the creation of a
comprehensive refugee response (CRR) “based on the principles of international cooperation and on burden- and responsibility-sharing. . . .”263 Specifically, world leaders called upon the UNHCR, in conjunction with relevant
states and UN agencies, to develop and initiate a CRR framework for each
situation involving large movements of refugees in close coordination with
relevant states and other UN agencies.264 While the Declaration lists elements that should be addressed in a CRR,265 it does not attempt to establish a
mechanism allowing for the calculation of a particular state’s obligations or
the imposition of binding obligations; instead, it relies entirely on voluntary
commitments.266 At the Summit, the General Assembly also committed to
adopting a global compact on refugees (GCR).267 The content of the GCR
were not specified, but the overarching objectives are easing pressures on
host countries; enhancing refugee self-reliance; expanding-third country
solutions; and supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.268
The New York Declaration has been heavily criticized. The New York
Times reported that “after days of intense negotiations over an international
agreement, the nations of the world on Tuesday adopted a draft that contained virtually no concrete commitments to make their journeys better or
261. U.N. Summit for Refugees and Migrants 2016, UNITED NATIONS, https://refugees
migrants.un.org/summit (addressing large movements of refugees and migrants) (last visited
Mar. 31, 2018).
262. New York Declaration, UNITED NATIONS, http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/declaration
(last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
263. G.A. Res. 71/1, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, Annex 1 ¶ 1
(Sept. 19, 2016).
264. Id. at ¶ 69.
265. Id. at Annex I. These elements include reception and admission, support for immediate and ongoing needs, support for host countries and communities, and durable solutions.
266. Emma Larking, The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants- What’s
Missing? REGARDING RTS. (Oct. 24, 2016), http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/regardingrights/2016/10/24/the-new-york-declaration-for-refugees-and-migrants-whats-missing/.
267. The UNHCR Quick Guide, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/57e4f6504.pdf (last
updated Jan. 28, 2018).
268. Id. at 7.
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safer. Nor does it have any force of law.”269 The Center for Migration Studies concluded that the declaration failed to create a new framework for the
protection of refugees and migrants around the world. Instead, they saw the
document as no more than a reaffirmation of the status quo and in some areas, it actually weakened current protections.270 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, a
former official at the United Nations refugee agency who is now a senior
fellow at the Migration Policy Institute in Washington, D.C., concluded that
the Declaration was too focused on the present and failed to prepare for future crises.271
The international rhetoric pledging a commitment to international cooperation and burden-sharing have done little to correct the disproportionate
burden that refugees place upon states of first asylum.272 These states, which
just happen to be located in close proximity to failed states, conflicts, or
gross human rights violations, bear the brunt of mass movements of refugees based simply upon shared borders, while countries located further away
are under no legal obligation to assist with resettlement. Various regional
instruments such as the EU Common European Asylum System273 could
have significant impact among state parties, but alone, they fail to solve the
greater international problem.274 Accordingly, a stronger mechanism in
which parties agree upon a method of burden-sharing is overdue. The idea
of burden-sharing is not new—scholars have struggled to resolve the issues
created by the 1951 Convention for decades. Over the years, many ideas
have been proposed by scholars. The following section will highlight three
burden-sharing proposals,275 including market-based agreements, group or
regional agreements, and soft quota agreements. While all models have
positive and negative attributes, the authors argue that the soft-quota model
offers the best solution to the current global refugee problem

269. Somini Sengupta, U.N. Drafts Agreement on Refugees and Migrants, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/world/un-united-nations-refugeesmigrants-agreement.html?_r=0.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Peter Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, 22 YALE J. INT’L L 243,
256–57 (1997).
273. Common European Asylum System is a set of laws in the EU that set out the minimum standards and procedures for asylum applications. See European Commission, supra
note 112.
274. Tally Kritzman-Amir, Not in My Backyard: On the Morality of Responsibility Sharing in Refugee Law, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 355, 377–78 (2009).
275. As discussed in this section, burden-sharing refers to the physical resettlement of
refugees in third countries.

2017]
1.

SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

87

Market-Based Quotas

In the 1990s, Peter Schuck introduced the idea of refugee quotas and
market trading into the dialogue.276 Under this system, Schuck proposed that
states must agree that all ought to bear a share of temporary protection and
that permanent resettlement must be divided proportionately based upon
state burden-bearing capacity.277 States first determine their protective capacity. Then, based upon that determination, quotas will be assigned to participating nations. States would then be free to buy or sell quota obligations.278 Shuck believes this plan would increase state participation and resources. Using Japan as an example, one writer explains that wealthy countries with ethnically homogenous societies and historically limited protection for refugees would be inclined to pay other nations to assume their obligation.279 Under this plan, the cost of the protection system would be reduced by transferring protection from high-cost countries to low-cost countries. Shuck indicates an agency such as the UNHCR would have to regulate
the system to ensure refugee rights were respected in the process.280
For obvious reasons, applying a market-based solution to the protection
of human beings has been viewed with skepticism.281 One author explains,
markets create inequities and “there may be market imperfections that, while
tolerable in the case of commodities, are unacceptable when dealing with
human lives.”282 Others add that this approach will not foster meaningful
burden-sharing, but instead is just one more way to confine refugees to developing countries.283
2.

Group or Regional Responsibility-Sharing

Another popular burden-sharing mechanism was proposed by James
Hathaway and Alexander Neve in the 1990s. They argued that regional or
group agreements to share responsibility were the most effective solution to

276. Schuck, supra note 268, at 279-85.
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278. Benjamin Cook, Method in Its Madness: The Endowment Effect in an Analysis of
Refugee Burden-Sharing and a Proposed Refugee Market, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 333, 348
(2004) (discussing Peter Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, 22 YALE J.
INT’L L 243, 251 (1997)).
279. Id. at 349.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Kritzman-Amir, supra note 270, at 303 (citing Deborah Anker et al., Crisis and
Cure: A Reply to Hathaway/Neve and Schuck, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 295, 303 (1998)).
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mass influx of refugees.284 Their model, which operates very much like an
insurance scheme, calls for collective responsibility in which member countries within designated groups agree ahead of time to contribute to the protection of refugees arriving within their territory.285 Hathaway and Neve also
maintain that the smaller group size allows for more efficient cooperation
and creates a greater incentive for states to cooperate since the effects of a
refugee crisis are felt locally, which also makes reaching an international
agreement more likely.286
Under the regional or group mechanism, a member country experiencing a mass influx of refugees will not take actions to stem the flow since
other members in the region will assist in a predetermined manner.287 One
proponent of regional agreements highlights the EU’s asylum agreements,
including the Dublin Accord, as a promising example of this model.288 Yet,
the EU’s CEAS has been heavily criticized for lack of state consistency and
unfair dealings with the Syrian refugees.289 In particular, while EU asylum
laws do not require asylum seekers to claim asylum in the first EU country
they reach, the Dublin Accord allows EU states to return refugees. Northern
states have used the Dublin Accord to their advantage and returned asylumseekers to overcrowded southern states.290 In that sense, the EU agreements
have disproved Hathaway and Neve’s belief that states within a regional
agreement will cooperate honestly and take an interest in the treatment of
refugees in other countries.291 This model is also criticized for placing a
greater burden upon developing nations and for creating an incentive for
countries with similar resources and risks to reach agreements to the exclusion of poor countries.292
3.

Soft Quotas

In many ways, the countries currently willing to resettle refugees loosely follow the soft quota model proposed by Atle Grahl-Madsen in the late
1970s.293 Similar to the other proposals mentioned above, Grahl-Madsen’s
284. James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 115, 141 (1997).
285. Id. at 143–46.
286. Kritzman-Amir, supra note 270, at 380.
287. Cook, supra note 274, at 347.
288. Kritzman-Amir, supra note 270, at 382.
289. Understanding Migration and Asylum in the European Union, supra note 239.
290. Id.
291. Kritzman-Amir, supra note 270, at 380.
292. Id. at 381.
293. Atle Grahl-Madsen, Ways and Prospects of International Cooperation in Refugee
Matters, 21/30 AWR BULL. 278 (1983).
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proposal recognizes that “collective action strengthens protection for refugees by reducing inequalities among receiving states.”294 Specifically, the
“soft quota” proposal calls for equitable distribution of refugees based upon
an index that considers individual country GNP and population density. After countries of first asylum reach their maximum capacity, the burdensharing mechanism would be triggered and other countries would resettle
refugees based upon a predetermined yearly quota. If quotas were surpassed,
the remaining resettlements would be decided on an ad hoc basis.295 Unlike
Hathaway and Neve’s model, quotas are not limited to regions or groups,
but instead are spread across all states.
Under this model, a conflict in State A causes a migration of refugees
to State B. When State B reaches a predetermined maximum capacity, the
international burden-sharing mechanism would be triggered, and States C
through Z would accept a predetermined number based upon their GNP and
population. Thus, refugees would be redistributed across many nations, not
just those in the affected region. If this model had been applied to the Syrian
refugee crisis, the burden on the states of first asylum and Europe would
have been significantly reduced. As discussed, the conflict in Syria led to
the mass migration of 5.9 million people. More than 4 million of those people sought asylum in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, presumably well above
those countries’ maximum capacity. Upon reaching maximum capacity (at a
much lower predetermined threshold), Syrian refugees would have been
distributed across the globe and not just in Europe.
It was previously mentioned that some members of the international
community already loosely follow the soft-quota model.296 For example, the
United States and Canada, in coordination with the UNHCR, both accept a
certain number of refugees each year for resettlement from states of first
asylum.297 So why has it not worked? First, only a limited number of countries currently accept refugees for resettlement. Second, the states that do
accept refugees for resettlement do so not based upon any binding arrangement, but instead because of international pressure, sense of responsibility,
and self-interest.298 Returning to the Syrian refugee crisis hypothetical, had
the United States been bound to accept a specified number of refugees pursuant to an international agreement, it would have been more difficult for
President Trump to abruptly reduce the number of spots for refugees in the
United States.

294. A. Suhrke, Burden-Sharing During Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective
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For the soft quota proposal to work, the United Nations, its subordinate
organizations, and member nations would need to be actively involved in
the refugee quota determination. Since all member states are represented at
the United Nations,299 it is an appropriate forum for international decisionmaking. Additionally, if the UN is in charge of the coordination of burdensharing agreements, then member states would have to comply pursuant to
their obligation to act in good-faith in support of the UN.300
The role of the UNHCR, in particular, would need to expand. Currently, the UNHCR facilitates voluntary responsibility-sharing related to refugees. Pursuant to its statute as a “nonpolitical, humanitarian, and social
body,” the UNHCR has the expertise and apolitical character that makes it
the most appropriate entity to work with member states to determine an equitable distribution of responsibility.301 While a precise explanation of how
the UNHCR would implement a burden-sharing mechanism is beyond the
scope of this paper, it is important to note that the UNHCR would have to
oversee the process of establishing state quotas and maximum capacity
rates. It would also need the ability to enforce agreed upon quotas.302
Domestic and international courts would have to assist the UNHCR in
the enforcement of responsibility sharing. The International Court of Justice
or various regional human rights courts would be likely candidates for international adjudication, but many nations are not party to those bodies. Additionally, burden-sharing agreements are viewed as diplomatic in nature. As a
result, may refrain from examining them.303 In either situation, domestic
courts would have to uphold their country’s commitment to international
burden-sharing agreements.
Similar to other models, the soft quota proposal is not without its faults.
For example, it requires a second migration to a new country, resulting in a
variety of negative side-effects. Using quotas also damages immigrant
communities which are an invaluable source of comfort and assistance to
their members. Bureaucratically dispersing refugees from the first state of
asylum to countries located potentially thousands of miles away will deteriorate immigrant communities.304 Additionally, this mechanism risks further
human rights violations in the form of an institutionalized forced removal by
allowing governments to transfer refugees to other states without regard to

299. See Overview, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/overview/
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the adequacy of protection they might receive.305 However, as with other
human rights treaties, international trends pull an increasing number of
states into the fold and into compliance. With time and international pressures, countries currently unwilling to accept refugees may change their
position
The soft quota model is just one of many potentially viable burdensharing proposals. Regardless of the model chosen, the international community has a duty to come together and find a satisfactory solution to the
world’s refugee problem. As noted by UN High Commissioner for Refugees
António Guterres in 2015, “if there is one Protocol that is yet to be drafted
to complement the 1951 Convention, it is one on international solidarity and
burden sharing.”306 Though there has been significant resistance, there is
also momentum building. The number one obstacle preventing conclusion
of an agreement is state sovereignty, but the current refugee crisis may finally be the catalyst needed to overcome that wall.
C.

Obstacles that Can Be Overcome

There are obvious obstacles standing in the way of a new treaty imposing costly duties upon states in addition to selecting and implementing an
effective burden-sharing mechanism. One only has to look to recent reports
from the New York Summit to see that, despite the current crisis, significant
opposition still exists. States rarely prefer the sovereign responsibilities over
sovereign rights,307 but history shows us that times of crisis allow for extraordinary achievements. The most prominent example was the creation of
the UN Charter. The events of World War II were so atrocious that all states
were willing to give up some sovereign rights to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”308 Other examples include the 1977 Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which was drafted following
the Vietnam War to prevent indiscriminate attacks against civilians, civilian
objects, cultural objects, and the natural environment, among others.309
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These are but two examples that show, in the right circumstances, that states
will put humanitarian concerns above sovereign rights.
The current refugee crisis can spur meaningful change in the international refugee regime. Not only would participation in a burden-sharing
agreement give states the moral high ground, it would be in their selfinterest to do so. Within this context, a burden-sharing agreement would
operate as an insurance policy. Countries may initially incur losses in the
short-term, but they are protected against much higher costs in the future.310
Again, looking at the situation in Syria—had there been a burden-sharing
agreement in place, resettlement out of the first states of asylum could have
moved more efficiently, Europe would not have been overrun, and countries
like Greece, Germany, and Sweden would not have been alone to carry most
of the weight of the refugee-initiated resettlement.
National security interests are also promoted by a binding resettlement
agreement. First, equitable resettlement will ensure overburdened countries
do not collapse and can preserve the availability of refugee protection in
states of first asylum. Michael Ignatieff from the Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy, recently concluded “it is in America’s national interest to help Europe manage and overcome this crisis by lending
strong political support to its major European allies, particularly Germany,
and by re-asserting its leadership role in refugee resettlement and integration.”311 In his White Paper, Ignatieff urges the United States accept 65,000
of the Syrian refugees to relieve pressure on the states of first asylum and to
show solidarity with Europe who is also struggling with the influx. By doing
so, the United States will strengthen and stabilize critical allies in both regions.312
Refugees and migrants also make important contributions in the fight
against terrorism, which further promotes national security. For example,
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence experts
worked extensively with immigrant communities for intelligence, and enlisted members in counterterror efforts.313 They found that immigrant communities had strong interests and incentive to cooperate and overwhelmingly
rejected extremist ideologies and terrorism.314
An equitable resettlement agreement also promotes international security by encouraging legal migration, curbing the use of human smugglers,
limiting the risk of trafficking, and making life more difficult for terrorists
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who depend upon and often profit from smuggling networks.315 Further, a
recent study from the World Economic Forum (WEF) cautioned that a
“large-scale involuntary migration” poses the most likely international risk
and is intrinsically connected to other worrisome risks, including interstate
conflicts and state collapse.316 The WEF found that three factors increase
threat of migration. 317 First, it determined that refugees are staying in host
nations longer than they used to stay.318 If unable to integrate into society,
refugees can become frustrated and more vulnerable to disenchantment and
radicalization. Second, similar to other experts, the WEF found that the international refugee regime is simply not able to respond to today’s challenges.319 It reached this conclusion because many countries, including Syria’s
neighbors, are not parties to the 1951 Convention, or if they are, they do not
uphold it.320 The final factor that increases the threat to the international
community is that most refugees move to other developing countries, where
government systems are already weak or likely to fail.321
Refugees can be of great benefit to their new states. In fact, refugees
are credited with significant economic, scientific, diplomatic, cultural, and
ethical contributions. The United States enjoyed successes from several famous immigrants, including Albert Einstein, Enrico Fermi, Elie Weisel,
Madeleine Albright, Andrew Grove, and Sergey Brin. The Council on Foreign Relations’ Independent Task Force on US Immigration Policy cautioned that to “keep out talented immigrants or significantly disrupt legitimate cross-border traffic or commerce” would weaken “the long-term foundations of America’s economy and military strength, and consequently its
security. . . .”322 Refugees are also needed in countries like Germany, Japan,
and the United States, which are facing rapidly aging populations, where
“young, well-educated, and highly motivated” workers are needed to fill
hundreds of thousands of available jobs.323 A recent study on the effects of
80,000 Iraqi, Bosnian, and Somalian refugees in Denmark revealed that the
presence of less-skilled refugees encouraged native workers to move up the
employment ladder to more complex and less manually-intensive occupa-
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tions.”324 In addition, the influx of refugees can help fund a country’s welfare system, which tends to become increasingly strained as more retirees
have to be financed by fewer working-age and tax-generating citizens.325
VI. CONCLUSION – THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS NOT READY
FOR THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS, BUT IT CAN BE READY FOR THE
INEVITABLE “NEXT TIME”
“Syria is the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time, a continuing cause of suffering for millions which should be garnering a
groundswell of support around the world.”326

The Syrian refugee crisis is but one of many crises occurring in the
world today. The UNHCR estimates that there are currently 65.3 million
forcibly displaced persons worldwide, 21.3 million of whom are refugees
who escaped persecution in their homelands and sought asylum elsewhere.
During times of conflict, regardless of location, people fleeing persecution
will continue to travel to neighboring states to seek protection.
The international rhetoric pledging a commitment to international cooperation and burden-sharing have done little to correct the disproportionate
burden that refugees place upon states of first asylum.327 These states, which
just happen to be located in close proximity to failed states, conflicts, or
gross human rights violations, bear the brunt of mass movements of refugees based simply upon shared borders while countries located further away
are under no legal obligation to assist with resettlement. A Second Optional
Protocol to the 1951 Convention is needed to establish binding international
quotas to ensure states of first asylum do not become overwhelmed and
close their doors to humanitarian crises.
The world’s refugees have grown impatient. Looking at the Syrian conflict, thousands of refugees rejected the poor conditions in the states of first
asylum and began risking their lives for the chance at something better in
Europe.328 They did not wait for state-sponsored resettlement—they resettled
themselves. It is too late to catch up with the Syrian refugee crisis, but it is
not too late to be better prepared for future crises. But to be ready, states
must be willing to relinquish a minimal amount of sovereignty and agree to
accept an equitable number of refugees for resettlement on an annual basis.
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